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Abstract
We derive the optimal contract in a two period costly state verication
model with repeated loans, where in each period, the borrower invests in
an identical project. We allow the borrower to switch lenders at the
end of the rst period. We show that while the second period optimal
contract continues to be a standard debt contract, the optimal contract
for the rst project need not be. Regardless of the form of the rst period
contract, there is less monitoring in the rst period and total monitoring
costs are strictly lower, relative to a sequence of short term contracts.
We illustrate our results assuming a uniform distribution for rm revenue
and xed monitoring costs. In particular, we show that either there is
no monitoring in the rst period or maximum possible amount consistent
with the outside option is collected in the second period.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the nature of the optimal contract in a two period model
with costly state verication and possibility to reinvest the residual from the rst
period in a second, identical project. The static environment is essentially that
of Gale and Hellwig (1985). That is, an entrepreneur borrows from a lender
to invest in a project that yields random returns at the end of one period.
These returns are privately observed by the entrepreneur but can be observed
by the lender at a cost, known as monitoring or verication cost: The cost is
possibly a function of revenue. The entrepreneur reports revenue and the lender
decides whether to monitor and the borrower repays the prespecied amount
corresponding to the reported revenue. Gale and Hellwig (GH from now on)
show that the optimal contract is a standard debt contract (SDC) in which the
lender sets the repayment to be a xed amount and monitors if and only if
the borrower reports a revenue less than this xed amount. In states that are
monitored, the lender seizes the entire revenue but incurs monitoring costs. We
assume that the entrepreneur is faced with an identical project in the second
period. A second loan may or may not be needed depending on the realization
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of revenue in the rst period. If there is a second loan, the sequence of events
of the rst period is repeated. Thus, the borrower reports revenue at the end of
the rst period, repays according to the initial contract and then invests again
in another, identical project. We assume that the revenues of the two projects
are independently and identically distributed. If a second loan is not needed,
the entrepreneur self-nances the project and there is no second contract. We
also assume that at date 1, the borrower has the option to borrow from a
di¤erent lender. The loan market is competitive so that the lender maximizes
the borrowers expected payo¤ subject to various constraints.
The aim of the paper is to derive the optimal contract between the lender and
the borrower in a dynamic setting with asymmetric information and uncertainty.
In particular, we want to examine whether the GH result that the static optimal
contract is an SDC holds in a dynamic framework and how the corresponding
total monitoring costs change. We show that the rst period optimal contract
need not be an SDC while the second period optimal contract must be. Further,
we show that the rst period repayment function is somewhat irrelevant over
the range of unmonitored states where a second loan is needed, except at the
limits. This is because the lender breaks-even over two periods and thus, a
higher (lower) repayment simply o¤sets a higher loan for the next period. We
nd that adding the second period, even though the two periods projects are
independent, weakens the incentive constraint of the borrower in the rst period
and thus, changes the properties of the rst period contract. Intuitively, this
occurs because of the need to borrow again. If the borrower reports a lower
revenue than the true level, it must borrow a larger amount than needed and
thus, agree to a larger expected repayment in the second period than needed.
One noteworthy feature of our two period setting is that the denition of
feasibility of a report changes. In the static setting, a report is feasible as long as
the corresponding repayment is less than the actual revenue. Thus, a borrower
can report a higher revenue as long as the required repayment is less than the
actual revenue. In our setting, this condition is not su¢cient for feasibility.
Indeed, reporting a higher revenue is possible only if the borrower intends to
take the money and run, and not borrow again. The reason is simple - if the
borrower reports a higher revenue than actual, it obtains a lower loan than
needed and thus cannot undertake the second project. This has an important
implication for determining optimal contract. Unlike the static setting, here it
is non-trivial to show that the incentive constraint binds.
We show that the optimal dynamic contract entails less monitoring in the
rst period, relative to the sequence of two short term GH contracts. Since this
sequence is also feasible, we conclude that the dynamic contract strictly domi-
nates the sequence of GH contracts, and lowers the total expected monitoring
costs. Further, the total net expected repayment at any state that is not mon-
itored at date one is constant. This constant is dened relative to the amount
the bank decides to collect in the second period if the borrower is monitored
in the rst period. In particular, if this amount is the cost of the project, the
constant payment in the rst period is simply the threshold revenue as in GH.
However, we show that this is not optimal. The rst period optimal contract en-
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tails monitoring up to a threshold, with full recovery and a xed amount above
the threshold when the second loan becomes unnecessary. However, between
these two thresholds, the repayment function need satisfy only the condition
that it is su¢ciently high so that a second loan is needed. However, despite
this indeterminacy, because of the second loan, it is as if the borrower repays
what it reports and receives the full amount of the loan. This is also true in
the monitored states. We illustrate our results by assuming that rm revenue
is uniformly distributed and the monitoring cost is xed. Further, we show in
this example that there is less monitoring in the rst period than in the static
contract. Thus, a dynamic relationship between the lender and the borrower
allows leniency in the rst period. Indeed, for some parameter values, there is
no monitoring in the rst period.
In most of our analysis, we assume that the borrowers decision to stay with
the current bank is observed by the bank. Further, if the borrower chooses to
leave, we assume that the bank monitors and seizes all revenue. When this
assumption is relaxed, so that the bank is either unable to observe and thus
unable to punish, or simply unable to punish, results change in an intuitive
way. The bank is no longer able to be lenient in the rst period. Indeed,
the optimal dynamic contract in this case is exactly the sequence of two GH
contracts. Thus, dynamics lead to no advantage if the borrower and lender
cannot enter into a long term relationship. In the intermediate case, where
the bank can observe whether the entrepreneur borrows again from it but not
whether there is another simultaneous borrowing from another bank, we show
that our results from the observable case continue to hold.
We also show that if the second period loan is di¤erent and small, it is
possible for the lender to break even if a dynamic contract is allowed but not
if only a sequence of contracts is allowed. However, this is possible only if the
borrower is punished for leaving at date one.
Costly state verication (CSV) models have received some attention in the
literature, since the seminal work of GH and Townsend (1979). Renou (2008)
studies multi-lender coalitions in a static CSV framework. In a recent paper,
Monnet and Quintin (2005) examine dynamic optimal contracts in a CSV frame-
work1 . A key di¤erence between this work and their work is the presence of
savings. Thus, in their model, all output is consumed in each period. This in
our view is a restrictive assumption especially in the context of banking, where
savings are a fundamental source of bank deposits and loans. Indeed, once sav-
ings are allowed, their main result, Theorem 1, does not provide much insight
into properties of optimal contracts as there can be many contracts satisfying
that result, including the ones that are not optimal. Further, in their model,
the bilateral relationship between a principal and agent is given, with no pos-
sibility of the agent walking away whereas in our framework, the extent of the
relationship in the second period depends on the rst period contract.
Our paper is closely related to Chang (1990). He considers one project
that yields cash ows over two periods and there is no second loan or project.
1Also see Smith and Wang (1998) in the context of dynamic risk sharing.
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Further, he assumes in the main analysis that the residual from rst period
is available for the lender to seize in the second period. That is, the residual
cannot be consumed nor used for other loans and thus, there is no limited
liability at date 2. He then argues that the optimal contract essentially remains
the same if the borrower were to consume all of the residual in the rst period
and the borrower prefers to enter into a covenant with the lender wherein such
consumption is prohibited. This is not the case in our model since the second
loan is associated with a second project and it is strictly better to invest in this
project rather than consume or put it aside for avoiding bankruptcy. We argue
that the scenario analyzed by Chang is rather restrictive since the borrower
must commit to putting aside the residual from the rst period. In addition,
despite some similarity in our rst period optimal contracts, our model captures
the dynamic nature of loan contracts. Thus, by adding a second loan as well
as allowing the borrower to switch lenders at date 1, our work enriches and
complements Changs analysis while at the same time allows us to compare the
sequence of GH contracts with the dynamic one. Webb (1992) considers an
environment similar to ours. There is one project at each date. We extend this
work in several ways. First, we allow the borrower to switch lenders at date
1. Given that the loan market is competitive, and there is no commitment, the
borrower ought to be able to choose who to borrow from at each date. This
has important e¤ects on the optimal contract. Second, we allow the lender to
break even over two time periods. This again is natural to assume given the
two period relationship between the lender and borrower. We also characterize
the solution.
Our paper also contributes to the wider literature on dynamic loan con-
tracts. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) study a two period environment in which
outcome of the rst report determines the probability with which the borrower
gets another loan. They show that the threat to cut-o¤ funding in the second
period induces the borrower to report truthfully in the rst. Thus, dynamics
weaken the incentive problem of the borrower. However, their main concern is
the issue of predation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the model is presented in section
2; date 0 problem is analyzed in section 3, a special case is analyzed in section
4. The example is presented in Section 5. The Appendix contains some proofs.
2 Model
There are two time periods. An entrepreneur with no wealth needs to borrow
L for the rst project and may need to borrow for the second if the residual
from the rst project is not su¢cient to self-nance. We denote the second loan
by l  L; taken at date 1: Note that L is the investment needed at each date.
The loan market is competitive. Thus, the lender is willing to lend provided
the expected repayment over two periods exceeds the total loan amount over
two periods. Let zt; t = 1; 2; denote the random revenue realized at date t;
assumed independently and identically over the two periods with a continuous
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density function f(:), whose support is [0;H]: It is assumed that Ezt is greater
than L; so that the project is protable. We also assume that these returns
are private information of the borrower/entrepreneur. The lender can observe
it only at a cost, given by c(zt):We assume that this function is continuous and
di¤erentiable.
At date 1, z1 is realized. The entrepreneur observes z1 and repays according
to R1(z1): Monitoring occurs according to M1(z1); which is either 0 (no moni-
toring) or 1 (monitoring). The entrepreneur borrows again if z1   R1(z1) < L;
receives the expected return of E(z2) and repays according to R2(z1; z2; l) and
gets monitored according to M2(z1; z2; l): If z1   R1(z1)  L; the entrepre-
neur self-nances. Let z denote the lowest revenue at which the entrepreneur
self-nances. We make the following assumption on the repayment function to
ensure that monitoring occurs in any one period. In the static setting, this
is trivially met since the borrower always reports the lowest realization in the
absence of monitoring.
Assumption 1: If there is no monitoring, ER1(z1) < L.
The entrepreneur has the option of borrowing from another lender at date
1, since the loan market is competitive. In the benchmark model, we assume
that the bank monitors if the borrower does not borrow again even though the
reported revenue is such that a second loan is needed. Thus, we assume that
the bank punishes the borrower for not borrowing again from it.2
3 Date 0 Problem
We rst state the static GH problem: the bank maximizes E(z  R(z)) subject
to R(z)  z; z  R(z)  z  R(z0);8z0 such that M(z0) = 0; and R(z0)  z; and
the bank breaks-even, that is, E(R(z)   c(z)) = L: GH show that the optimal
contract is an SDC in which R(z) = bz and M(z) = 0 for all z  bz and R(z) = z
and M(z) = 1 for all z < bz: That is, low states are monitored at a cost; there
is full recovery in such states and repayment is a constant in the unmonitored
states, the constant being equal to the threshold of monitoring.
The sequence of two short-term GH contracts amounts to the bank lending
L to the rm at date 0 and L   (z   R(z)) at date 1. The bank breaks even
per period and does not take into account the possibility that the same rm
may borrow from it again. That is, the bank treats the relationship as a one
period relationship. In this case, the maximization problem in each period is
identical to the static problem, except that in the second period, the loan amount
is di¤erent (lower in the solvent states). Thus, the rst period monitoring
threshold remains bz while the second period threshold decreases with the rst
period z because the second loan equals L  (z   bz):
2The borrower has the option to underreport and borrow again from the bank to escape
this punishment. This is already covered by the incentive constraint IC1 below. The borrower
may also consider using the residual to borrow from another lender but it can be shown that
given only one project, that option is strictly inferior to staying with the bank.
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We now study the dynamic contracting problem in which the bank enters
into a long term relationship with the rm, taking into account the possibility
that the rm has an incentive to switch lenders at date 1. We rst consider
the scenario in which the bank observes what the rm does at date 1 and then
examine the unobservable case.
It is straightforward to show that the last periods problem is similar to the
one period problem of GH. That is, given z1 and the loan l, the bank decides on
the threshold z2d(z1; l) such that it monitors if z2 < z2d(z1; l) and R2(z2; z1; l) =
z2 and does not monitor if z2  z2d(z1; l) and R2(z2; z1; l) = z2d(z1; l). Then,
the expected revenue is
E (R2j(z1; l)) =
Z z2d(z1;l)
0
z2dF + z2d(z1; l) [1  F (z2d(z1; l))]
and the expected monitoring cost is a function of the expected revenue E (R2j(z1; l)) ;
Cz2(z2d(z1; l)) =
Z z2d(z1;l)
0
c (z2) dF = CR2(E (R2j(z1; l)))
A di¤erence from the static model is that the second period problem does not
require the bank to break even in the single period. Thus, E (R2j(z1; l))  
CR2(E (R2j(z1; l))) need not equal l: Instead, the bank xes E (R2j(z1; l)), de-
termines z2d(z1; l); taking into account the fact that the contract must be a
standard debt contract, and then computes the expected monitoring cost. Note
that CR2 is an increasing function of ER2:
In the rst period, the entrepreneur receives z1, makes a report to the lender
and asks for a second loan of l  0. Then, assuming truthful reporting for the
time being, the rst period payo¤ to the entrepreneur, conditional on z1 and l;
is,
z1  R1(z1)  [L  l] :
In the 2nd period, conditional on z1 and l; the entrepreneur pays to the bank, in
expected value, E (R2j(z1; l)) : Therefore, the expected prot in the 2nd period
is Ez2  E (R2j(z1; l)) : Therefore, the total expected prot of the entrepreneur
in two periods, conditional on z1 and l; is
V (z1; l) = z1  R1(z1)  L+ l + Ez2   E (R2j(z1; l)) :
The break-even constraint: The banks two period expected prot condi-
tional on z1 and l; is,
(z1; l) = R1(z1)  l + E (R2j(z1; l))  c(z1M1(z1))  CR2(E (R2j(z1; l)))  L
Substituting the banks prot equation into the entrepreneurs utility function,
we obtain,
V (z1; l) = z1 + Ez2   (z1; l)  c(z1M1(z1))  CR2(ER2j(z1; l))  2L
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Because the bank breaks even, E((z1; l)) = 0; and thus, by taking expectation
over z1, we obtain
EV = Ez1 + Ez2   Ec1   ECR2   2L (1)
where Ec1 denotes expected monitoring costs in the rst period and ECR2 de-
notes expected monitoring costs in the second period. Because CR2 is increasing
in E (R2j(z1; l)), loan l should be chosen so as to minimize E (R2j(z1; l)). The
break-even constraint implies that the higher the loan l, the higher has to be
the revenue. Therefore, the bank induces the entrepreneur, who reports z1; to
ask for the lowest loan possible, l(z1) = L+R1(z1)  z1.3 Thus, we now drop
the argument l; for convenience.
The bank designs the two-period contract in order to maximize (1), or equiv-
alently, minimize the sum of expected monitoring costs, subject to,
Feasibility constraints:
z1  R1 (z1)0;
Dynamic Incentive compatibility constraints:
IC1: Suppose the entrepreneur stays with the same bank at date 1. Then,
Ez2   E (R2jz1)  Ez2   E (R2jz0) + z1   z0;
for all z1; z1 > z
0 such that z1   R1 (z1) < L and z0 is not observed. Note
that, z1  R1 (z0)  0; by feasibility. The condition z1 > z0 is required because
otherwise, the lie is not feasible.4 To see this, note that if z0 > z1; where z1 is
the true state, overreporting implies that the rm must borrow L+R1(z
0) z0 <
L+R1(z
0) z1; the amount of loan needed. Thus, the rm is unable to carry out
the second project if it overreports, and therefore, unlike the static GH or Chang
(1990), in our model, we do not need the corresponding incentive constraint.
The LHS of IC1 incorporates the fact that the borrower reinvests the residual
from the rst period. We can show that it is better for the borrower to do
so than consume. The RHS assumes that the borrower consumes the residual
z1   z0 because there is no other investment opportunity available.
Simplifying IC1 leads to,
E(R2jz1)  E(R2jz0) + z0   z1; (2)
3Suppose in the rst period, the entrepreneur reports z and asks for the loan l. The
minimum loan in this case is l(z) = L + R1(z)   z, and thus, by setting up E (R2j(z; l)) to
be
E (R2j(z; l)) = E (R2jz) + f(z;l);l = l   l
(z)
where
fl(x;l)  1;
then, the entrepreneur, given report z, will ask for a loan of l(z) = L+R1(z)  z:
4Notice that this is slightly di¤erent from the intertemporal incentive compatibility con-
straint of Chang (1990), even when he allows for consuming all the residual.
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for all z1 > z
0; such that M1(z
0) = 0.
IC2: This constraint prevents the borrower from going to another lender.
Let
Ec(l) 
Z z^(l)
0
c(z1)dF (z)
where z^(l) solves, Z z^
0
(z   c(z))dF (z) +
Z H
z^
z^dF (z) = l
Let
ER(l) =
Z z^(l)
0
(z)dF (z) +
Z H
z^(l)
z^dF (z)
be the expected repayment corresponding to a loan of l in the static model. Note
that ER(l) = l + Ec(l): We shall also use the notation introduced earlier for
date 2, namely, CR1(ER): Given ER; z^ is a function of ER; and thus, expected
monitoring costs is a function of ER: Indeed, this function is the same as derived
for date 2 and thus, where convenient, we shall drop the reference to the time
period.
Now, Ec(L) is the expected cost of monitoring in a one-period GH contract
with loan L. Then IC2 is,
Ez2   E(R2jz1)   L+ Ez2   Ec(L)
for all z1 that are not monitored (provided the borrower stays with the current
lender) and for which a second loan is needed. The RHS presumes that if the
borrower leaves, the lender monitors, seizing everything so that the borrower
must borrow the full amount from another lender. Note that the inequality also
holds for states that are monitored, in order for the bank to keep the borrower
for the second period. This constraint simplies to,
E(R2jz1)  L+ Ec(L)
Suppose that zd is the lowest state that is not monitored.
5 IC1 implies that
E(R2jz) is decreasing in z: Then IC1 and IC2 imply that
E(R2jz1)  L+ Ec(L); z1  zd (3)
E(R2jz1)  E(R2jz0) + z0   z1; z1  z0  zd; z1  R1 (z1) < L: (4)
IC3
So far, we assumed that the unmonitored states were such that a second
loan was needed. If z1 is high enough so that z1   R1(z1)  L, a second loan
is not needed. The incentive constraints are di¤erent for this case. Here our
5We show later that this must be the case in an optimal contract given the assumptions
on the monitoring cost function.
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assumption is that if the reported state is such that a second loan is not needed,
the bank does not monitor. We show later that there exists a value z, such that
for all z1  z, a second loan is not needed so that the IC constraint for this
type, for zd  z0 < z is:
z1  R1(z1)  L+ Ez2  z1  R1(z0)  (z0  R1(z0)) + Ez2   E (R2jz0)
R1(z1)  z0 + ER2jz0   L (5)
If z0 is also above z, then for all z1; z
0  z; we need,
z1  R1(z1)  L+ Ez2  z1  R1(z0)  L+ Ez2
Thus,
R1(z1) = R1(z
0)
for all z1; z
0 above z.
To prevent z < z; such that z R1(z)  0; from pretending to be z, we must
have,
Ez2 E(R2jz)  max[z R1(z); Ez2 ER2(L z+R1(z))] = Ez2 ER2(L z+R1(z))
The rst term in the max operator is the amount obtained by overreporting
and not operating the second project and the second term is the amount from
overreporting and borrowing from another lender. It can be shown that the
project is protable enough to ensure the last equality. By the one-period
break-even constraint of the other lender, we obtain,
L  z +R1(z) + Ec(L  z +R1(z))  E(R2jz)
R1(z)  E(R2jz) + z   L  Ec(L  z +R1(z))
for all z < z such that z  R1(z)  0. Combined with the earlier result (5), we
obtain that for zd  z < z ,
E(R2jz) + z   L  Ec(L  z +R1(z))  R1(z)  E (R2jz) + z   L (6)
The two period break-even constraint of the lender can now be simpli-
ed as follows:
ER1 + E(E(R2))  L+ E(l) + Ec1 + E(Ec2))
Here,
E(Ec2) =
Z z
0
Z z2d(z;l)
0
c(z2)dF (z2)dF (z1)
E(E(R2)) =
Z z
0
E (R2jz) dF (z)
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Ec1 is the expected monitoring cost incurred in the rst period and E(Ec2) in
the second period. Now, l = max[L+R1(z) z; 0], so we have, letting R1(z) = R,Z z
0
R1(z)dF+
Z H
z
RdF+E(E(R2)) = L+
Z z
0
(L+R1(z)  z)dF+Ec1+E(Ec2))
Z H
z
RdF + E(E(R2)) = L+
Z z
0
(L  z)dF + Ec1 + E(Ec2) (7)
Notice that R1(z) does not appear in the constraint, except for those realizations
where the second loan is not needed. However, we require that z R1(z) < L; for
all z < z; a condition trivially met for the monitored states. Further, although
R1(z) does not appear explicitly, the additional loan amount in state z of L  z
suggests that it is as if the rm surrenders all it has in all states, monitored or
not, and then borrows the full amount L again. That is, it is as if R1(z) = z
and l(z) = L for all z < z : Or, one can also think that the rm pays nothing
to the bank at date 1 and instead uses its rst period revenue towards reducing
the loan for the second period. That is, it is as if R1(z) = 0 and l(z) = L z for
all z  z = L: The two interpretations are equivalent from the banks point of
view. This constraint also implies that there is no di¤erence between monitored
and non-monitored states in terms of what is repaid and what is borrowed for
the second time.
Lemma 1 Let H be arbitrarily high. There exists z, such that for all z  z, a
second loan is not needed.
Proof. Because of IC1 and IC2 constraints (that is, (3) and (4)), for any z  zd;
ER2jz  ER2jzd   (z   zd):
For su¢ciently large z, RHS is negative, which is not permitted, and thus in this
case, ER2jz = 0 for z = ER2jzd + zd and for all z  z. For these states, truth-
telling fails if R(z) is such that a loan is needed. This is because for all such
states, the second period expected repayment is zero and the current period net
payo¤ from truth telling is also zero. However, reporting z when the true state
is higher, yields a net gain of z  z: Thus, for all z  z = ER2jzd + zd; we must
have L = 0 and R(z)  ER2jzd + zd   L: Note that this satises IC3.
Proposition 1 The sequence of GH contracts satises all the constraints in the
two period maximization problem.
Proof. The feasibility constraints are obviously satised. The second period
ICC are also satised because the second period contract is an SDC. We now
check the rst period ICC.
IC1 requires E(R2jz0)  E(R2jz) + z   z0: In GH, E(R2jz) = l(z) + Ecl(z),
because the break-even constraint holds per period. Substituting, we get, l(z0)+
Ecl(z0))  l(z) + Ecl(z) + z   z0; for all z0 < z. Since l(z0)   l(z) = z   z0; IC1
reduces to Ecl(z0)  Ecl(z), which holds because l(z0) > l(z):
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IC2 holds by denition since GH set up is period by period.
IC3 also holds because in an SDC, states are monitored upto a threshold and
then there is a constant required repayment in solvent states. Substituting for
ER2jz and the rst period threshold bz; we nd that the lower bound on R(z)
is bz while the upper bound is bz + Ecl(z): Thus, the constraint is met.
Finally, the GH contract satises the break even constraint per period and
thus satises the two period break even constraint.
This Proposition shows that the optimal contract is at least as good as the
sequence of two short-term standard debt contracts. We later show that the
optimal dynamic contract is strictly better.
Lemma 2 Suppose that c(z)f(z)1 F (z) is an increasing function of z. Then, the con-
straint
E[R2jz0]  E[R2jz] + z   z0 8z0 > z  zd
is binding at the optimum.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The Lemma derives su¢cient conditions for IC1 to bind. Recall that unlike
the static GH, in our model, it is not possible to overreport. Thus, the inequality
does not hold in both directions and therefore, does not trivially bind. The
condition in the Lemma implies that the expected monitoring cost function is
a convex function of the amount to be raised. That is, CR2(ER2) is convex.
Corollary 1 The optimal dynamic contract strictly dominates the sequence of
GH contracts.
Proof. From Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, and the fact that the incentive
constraint IC1 is slack when the sequence of GH contracts is used, the result
follows.
This Corollary implies that when the lender can observe the borrowers deci-
sion to stay or leave, it is possible to design a dynamic contract that lowers the
total monitoring costs relative to the sequence of two GH contracts. In what
follows, we derive some properties of the optimal contract.
Lemma 3 There exists zd 2 [0;H] such that M1(z) = 18z < zd and M1(z) =
08z  zd:
Proof. Suppose not. Then WLOG, there exist values z1 > 0 and H > z2 > z1,
such that M1(z) = 1 8z 2 (z1; z2) and M1(z) = 0 for all z =2 (z1; z2): Let
E[R2j0] = R02: Then, by the binding IC1, E[R2jz0] = R02   z0 8z0 2 [0; R02]:
Notice that this must apply to z 2 (z1; z2) because it is possible for the rm
to understate and escape monitoring. However, this expected second period
revenue is the same as one where there is no monitoring. Further, the lenders
break-even constraint remains unchanged in all other respects. Thus, z1 = 0
and z2  0:
Note that when only low states are monitored, the expected second period
revenue function is no longer necessarily E[R2jz0] = R02   z0 because of the
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inability to mimic up and the inability to report the state to be a monitored
one when it is actually not monitored.
Let E (R2jz)  R2; for all z  zd: Thus, we assume that the same amount
is raised in the second period for all states upto and including the monitoring
threshold.
Lemma 4 Under the assumptions of Lemma 2, R1(z)  R = R2 + zd   L:
Proof. Recall (6): for all z 2 [zd; z) such that z  R  0
E (R2jz) + z   L  Ec
 
L  z +R  R  E (R2jz) + z   L
By denition, we have,
R+ L = z:
Consider, for arbitrarily small positive , z^ such that
z^ = R+ L  :
Then, z^ < z and by the rst inequality and Lemma 2, we have,
E (R2jz^) = R2 + zd   z^  R+ L  z^ + Ec
 
R+ L  z^ = + Ec()
) z^ = R+ L    R2 + zd     Ec()
) R+ L  R2 + zd   Ec()
Now, from the second inequality, we get to see that
R+ L  E (R2jz) + z = R2 + zd
Since c(:) is continuous, with c(0) = 0; and these two inequalities hold for any
small , we have shown that
R = R2 + zd   L: (8)
This Lemma shows that it is optimal to ask for the maximum amount possi-
ble in all states in which the rm does not need a second loan. At z = R2 + zd;
we saw that to ensure truth-telling, the bank must leave su¢cient residual for
the rm to self-nance. This Lemma implies that this residual must be mini-
mum possible. Of course, the residual is higher for all revenue levels that are
higher than R2 + zd; because the repayment must be constant for such states
to induce truth-telling, as in the static model.
Corollary 2 For all z  zd; R1(z)+E (R2jz)  (L+R1(z)  z) = R2+ zd L:
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Proof. Since IC1 binds, we have
E[R2jz] = E[R2jz0] + z0   z 8z > z0  zd;
) E[R2jz] = E[R2jzd] + zd   z
Thus, R1(z) + E (R2jz)   (L + R1(z)   z) = E[R2jzd] + zd   z   L + z =
R2 + zd   L:
The Corollary shows that the net total payment to the lender is constant
for all realizations not monitored. This result is similar to Chang (1990) and
is intuitive. In order to provide incentives to the rm to report truthfully, the
lender ends up specifying the same net total repayment over two time periods
for all unmonitored states. This result preserves the spirit of the static GH
where repayment is constant in all unobserved states.
We next show that under the assumptions of Lemma 2, the optimal rst
period monitoring threshold is strictly less than the static threshold, denoted
as zGH :
Proposition 2 Suppose that c(z)f(z)1 F (z) is an increasing function of z: Then, zd <
zGH .
Proof. See the Appendix.
As we can see, in our dynamic model, in the rst period, the monitoring
threshold is zd < zGH , i.e. the bank is more lenient in the rst period. This
is in contrast to the common results in the literature on dynamic contracts such
as Bolton and Scharfstein, Monnet and Quintin, etc. This is because the net
benet in the rst period obtained by the entrepreneur is not used as savings to
reduce the second period loan, which reduces the overall nancing cost of the
bank as well. In standard dynamic contracts, the per-period net prot of the
rm is only used as consumption, only benetting the rm. We can highlight
the contrast by considering the case where the bank cannot observe whether the
rm will stay with the bank or not when he o¤ers the 2nd period contract. In
the above model, the bank could observe separation by the rms, and thus could
punish it with monitoring. But in this case the bank does not know whether
the rm uses the rst period net revenue as savings at the same bank or take it
to the other banks. Then, it is no longer optimal for the bank to be lenient in
the rst period. The following Proposition formalizes the argument.
Lemma 5 In the unobservable case, zd  zGH .
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now show that the optimal dynamic contract in the unobservable case
must be the sequence of GH contracts. That is, if the bank cannot observe if
the borrower stays with it or not, it is as if there is no long term contract. Letbz2(z) denote the second period monitoring threshold under GH, as a function
of the rst period realization.
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Proposition 3 In the unobservable case, zd = zGH and for all z; z2d(z) =bz2(z):
Proof. The dynamic incentive constraint in this case is modied as:
z+E (R2jz)  minfz0+ER2jz0; L+ zd+Ec(L+ zd  z)g; L+ zd  z > z0  zd
The rst element in the min function is the same as in the observable case.
The second part ensures that the borrower stays for each z: Now, suppose that
zd > zGH and that
ER1 + E (E(R2jz)) = L+ Ec(L) + E (L+ zGH   z + Ec(L+ zGH   z)) :
That is, total expected revenue is the same in the dynamic case and the GH
case. Then, the total expected cost di¤erence between the two is
ECR1(L+ Ec(L)) + ECR2 (L+ zGH   z + ECR1(L+ zGH   z))  ECR1 (ER1)  ECR2 (ER2jz)
= E

@CR(R
)
@R
(L+ zGH   z + ECR(L+ zGH   z)  ER2jz)

+
@CR(R
)
@R
(L+ Ec(L)  ER1)
= E

@CR(R
)
@R
  @CR(R
)
@R

(L+ Ec(L)  ER1) < 0
The last inequality follows because L+ Ec(L)  ER1 < 0 since zd > zGH ; and
given that,
R 2 (L+ Ec(L); ER1) ; R 2 (ER2jz; L+ Ec(L))
by convexity of CR(ER);
@CR(R
)
@R
>
@CR(R
)
@R
:
Thus, zd = zGH : Then, the bank breaks even in the rst period. Thus, the bank
must also break even in the second period. That is,
E (ER2jz) = E (L+ zGH   z + Ec(L+ zGH   z))
By the incentive constraint presented above,
ER2jz  L+ zd   z + Ec(L+ zd   z)8L+ zd  z  zd
Since zd = zGH ; we have,
ER2jz  L+ zGH   z + Ec(L+ zGH   z)8L+ zGH  z  zGH
Thus, for the bank to break-even in the second period, we must have this con-
straint bind. This means that the second period contract is identical to the GH
contract.
The unobservable case leads to an interesting question: what if the rst
period bank is only a one-period bank while the entrepreneur lives for two
periods and the bank knows it? In this case, the rst period bank maximizes
the entrepreneurs expected utility E(z1  R1(z1)) subject to,
z1  R1 (z1)0;
E (R2jz1) = E (R2jz0) + z1   z0;
for all z1; z1 > z
0 such that z1   R1 (z1) < L and z0 is not observed. We are
assuming here that the entrepreneur cannot use z1  z0 towards the second loan
from a second bank. That is, z1   z0 must be consumed. Thus IC1 remains the
same even though the rst bank lives for one period. The idea is that truth-
telling for bank 1 needs to take into account the fact that the entrepreneur
borrows again from another bank.
The break-even constraint of the rst bank is
ER1 = L+ Ec1
In order to solve its maximization problem, the rst bank must solve for
E (R2jz) ; which requires solving the second banks maximization problem. We
know that the second period optimal contract is a standard debt contract sat-
isfying the break-even condition
E (R2jz) = l(z) + Ecl(z)
where l(z) = L+R1(z)  z:
We argue that the rst bank can implement the dynamic contract by setting
E (R2jz) = R2 + zd   z; solving for l(z) and then setting R1(z) accordingly.
Since the two-period break-even constraint is satied, and the second period
break-even constraint is satised by construction, the rst period break-even
constraint must be satised as well. Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 4 If the entrepreneur must consume the residual from misrepre-
sentation of revenue, even if the rst period bank is a one-period bank, as long
as the entrepreneur borrows again, the dynamic contract can be implemented.
This implies that the rst period contract is di¤erent from the GH contract.
So far, we have considered two cases. In one, the bank perfectly observes
the amount of loans from the other banks and thus can punish the borrower,
and in the second, the unobservable case, the bank cannot punish any deviation
from the dynamic relationship. We now assume that the bank can observe if
the rm decides not to make any loan contract in the 2nd period and punish
the deviation with monitoring. But the bank does not observe whether the
entrepreneur has opened another loan contract or not, and therefore cannot
punish that behavior. Then, the rm in the 1st period receiving z can deviate
by reporting z0 to the bank and pay to the bank
ER2jz0
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and at the same time, go to the other bank for the loan contract with the loan
of l = L+R1(z
0)  z and pay to the bank
L+R1(z
0)  z + Ec(L+R1(z0)  z):
Because the entrepreneur only has one project, the outcome of the project is
still z2 only. Therefore, the new truth telling constraint is
ER2jz  ER2jz0 + L+R1(z0)  z + Ec(L+R1(z0)  z);8z  zd
Now, let the bank set the rst period revenue to be R1(z) = z, the maximum
possible level. Then, if the entrepreneur stays with the bank, its objective
function, and thus the outcome will not change. However, the above constraint
changes to
ER2jz  ER2jz0 + L+ z0   z + Ec(L+ z0   z);8z  zd
Rewriting it, we obtain
ER2jz + z  ER2jz0 + z0 + L+ Ec(L+ z0   z);8z  zd
we can immediately see that this constraint is weaker than IC1 for z0  z, and
furthermore, misreporting z0 > z is not feasible. Therefore, given IC1, this
constraint is slack.
Thus, in the intermediate case where the borrower may borrow from multiple
lenders to escape monitoring, the optimal dynamic contract does not change.
4 A special case
So far, we have seen that in the observable case, the bank can reduce monitor-
ing cost by o¤ering a dynamic loan contract which o¤ers leniency in the rst
period and toughness in the second period. Even if the bank cannot observe the
continuation of the contract by the entrepreneur, the bank can o¤er a dynamic
contract that is di¤erent from static GH contract and reduce the total moni-
toring cost by o¤ering tough initial period monitoring threshold and leniency
in the 2nd period. Tough monitoring threshold prevents the entrepreneur from
underreporting their rst period status and obtain assets to carry over to other
banks, and leniency in the second period increases the attractiveness of staying
with the same bank. In both cases, we can see that the dynamic contract im-
proves on the loan market incompleteness by reducing the overall monitoring
cost. In this section, we show that in the observable case, under dynamic con-
tract, entrepreneurs with projects that are protable but not protable enough
to obtain a GH loan contract are able to get funding.
Assume that the rst period loan (investment) is L+  > L, where L is the
second period investment needed. The amount  is such thatZ z
0
(z   c(z))dF (z) +
Z H
z
zdF (z) = L+ 
16
Here z is the maximizer of
R z^
0
(z   c(z))dF (z) + RH
z^
z^dF (z) with respect to
z^. Thus, we are assuming that in a one-period GH, the lender monitors the
maximum possible and just breaks-even. If  is slightly higher, the one-period
GH becomes unviable. Thus, the lender is indi¤erent between lending and not
lending. Assume that it does not lend, just for one period.
The second period loan being smaller allows the lender to break-even without
maximum monitoring if the borrower were to go to another lender, rather than
stay with the current one. Thus, the outside option continues to be dened
in the same way as above. And thus, the incentive compatibility constraints
remain unchanged, leading to the same ER2 as derived earlier and the same
E(R(z)) and l(z) expressions.
We now show that if the lender were allowed to o¤er a two-period dynamic
contract, the borrower is able to borrow in the rst period as well. That is,
while the GH one-period contract fails, the two period contract survives.
The two-period break-even constraint (setting R2 = L+Ec(L)) changes to:Z z^d
0
(z   c(z))dF (z) + (1  F (z^d)z^d + Ec(L) = L+  + E(Ec2)
By denition of z, setting z^ = z, we get,
0 = E(Ec2)  Ec(L)
Since Ec(L)  E(Ec2), because l(z)  L, the equality does not hold or rather,
the break-even constraint is slack at z. Thus, there exists z^ < z which makes
the lender just break even without maximum monitoring in the rst period.
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the rst period loan is L+ while the second period
loan is L. There exist values of , such that a one-period SDC does not allow
the lender to break-even whereas a two-period contract in which the lender lends
in both periods, does.
5 UniformDistribution and xed monitoring cost
Let c(z) = k > 0 for all z and let f(z) = 1
H
. Thus, the monitoring cost is xed
and the distribution of revenues is uniform. Let L = 1:
The static monitoring threshold z^ is given by,Z z^
0
(z   k)dz + z^(H   z^) = H: (9)
The solution is,
z^ = H   k  
p
(H   k)2   2H
Similarly, the second period monitoring threshold, which corresponds to a static
threshold except for a loan amount l = 1 + z^   z; is given by,
z^2 = H   k  
p
(H   k)2   2H(1 + z^   z); z^  z  1 + z^
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Note that Ec(L) = kz^
H
. Also, the following parameter restrictions are im-
plied: p
(H   k)2   2H  0 () k  H  
p
2H
Note also that H > 2; for the upper bound on k to be positive.
We also need 1 + z^  H; for the loan to become zero at some revenue level.
This is not essential but assumed in our analysis. This condition boils down to
1 +H   k  
p
(H   k)2   2H  H
1  k 
p
(H   k)2   2H
Recall that E(R2jzd) = R2:Then, the second-period threshold in the dy-
namic case is
z2d = H  
p
H2   2H(R2 + zd   z); R2 + zd  z  zd;bz = H  p(H)2   2HR2; z  zd:
The rst period threshold can be derived from the break-even constraint (7).
Letting c = kbz

H
,
EEc2 = zd
c
H
+
Z R2+zd
zd
k
z2d
H2
dz
Thus, the break even constraint becomes:
 z2d + 2(H   k   c)zd   (4LH   2HR2 +
2k
H
Z zd
z^d
z^2ddz) = 0
zd = H   k   c 
r
(H   k   c)2   2(2H  HR2 + k 
H
)
where  =
R z^d+R2
z^d
z^2ddz =HR2   13H
 
H3   (H   bz)3 :
Note that parameters must be constrained to ensure that zd  0, for all
values of R2. In particular, if R2 = 0, zd = H   k  
p
(H   k)2   4H, so
that k  H   2pH. We also need 2(2H   HR2 + k H )  0 ) 2H   HR2 +
k
H

HR2   13HH3   (
p
(H)2   2HR2)3

 0: This implies that R2 cannot be
too high. Finally, we also need (H   k   c)2   2(2H  HR2 + k H )  0:
Total monitoring costs under two-period GH (no dynamics) are:
Mgh =
z^
H
k +
z^
H
(k
z^
H
) +
k
H2
Z z^+1
z^
z^2dz
and total monitoring costs under two period with dynamics are,
Md =
z^d
H
k +
z^d
H
(k
z^
H
) +
k
H2
Z z^d+R2
z^d
z^2ddz
Despite a multitude of parameter restrictions, we can derive the following result.
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Proposition 6 Dynamic monitoring costs are strictly decreasing in R2:
Proof. We show that Md is a strictly decreasing function of R2 over [0; 1 +
Ec(L)]. Di¤erentiating Md, we obtain
dMd
dR2
=
k
H
[(1 +
z^
H
)z0d +
zd
H
z^0] +
k
H2
0
Now, z^0 = H
H z
> 0, 0 = H   (H z^)2
H
z^0 = z^ > 0. Substituting,
dMd
dR2
< 0 () z0d +
zd
H   z^ +
z^
H
(1 + z0d) < 0
Now,
z0d =  
k
H   z^ +
kH k c
H z^
+ k
H
z^  Hq
(H   k   c)2   2(2H  HR2 + k H )
Next, we show that 1 + z0d < 0.
1 + z0d = 1 
k
H   z^ +
kH k c
H z^
+ c H
H   k   c  zd :
or
1 + z0d < 0 () (H   z^)( k   zd) + kzd < 0
This holds if H   z^ > k. Substituting for z^ = pH2   2HR2, we get H  
z^   k > 0 if and only if H2 k22H > R2. Now it su¢ces to show that H
2 k2
2H >
L + k z^
H
= maxR2. This follows because the inequality reduces to (H   k)2 >
2(H   k
p
(H   k)2   2H and (H   k)2 > 2H.
Next, we show that z0d +
zd
H z^
< 0.
z0d+
zd
H   z^ < 0 ()  k(H k c zd)+(H k c)k+(c H)(H z^
)+zd(H k c zd) < 0
or
(c H)(H   z^) + zd(H   c  zd) < 0
or
(c H)(H   z^   zd)  z2d < 0
Thus, it su¢ces to show that H   z^   zd > 0. Substituting for H   z^ =p
H2   2HR2 and zd, we need,
H   k   c 
r
(H   k   c)2   2(2H  HR2 + k 
H
) <
p
H2   2HR2
Simplifying, we obtain,
H2   4H   2k
H
+ 2
r
(H   k   c)2   2(2H  HR2 + k 
H
)
p
H2   2HR2 > 0
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We now show that this holds because H2   4H   2k
H
> 0. Recall that,
 =
Z zd+R2
zd
z2d(z)dz < z^
R2 < z^
H
2
<
H2
2
:
Thus,
4H +
2k
H
< 4H + kH < H2 () H > 4 + k
This holds because by assumption k < H 2pH < H 4; because for k > 0;H
must be greater than 4.
The graph below shows total monitoring costs in GH v/s in the dynamic case
for H = 25; L = 1 and k = 14. It is clear that the dynamic case entails lower
monitoring costs. Note that, for these parameter values, 1 + Ec(L) = 2:44.
However, monitoring costs become negative at this level because zd becomes
su¢ciently negative. This is not allowed and thus, optimal value of R2 is the
lower of the two values, 1 + Ec(L) and the value at which zd becomes zero.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
0
1
2
3
x
y
Md (green) and Mgh (red) as a function of R2
Corollary 3 z0d < 0.
Proof. It su¢ces to show that kH k c
H z^
+c H < 0, or  (H c)(h z^ k) k2 <
0. This holds if H   c > 0 and H   z^   k > 0. Now, H > c and the second
inequality has been shown to hold in the previous proof.
Thus, as the bank collects more in the second period, and thus monitors
more in the second period, the rst period monitoring threshold declines. This
is intuitive given the trade-o¤ between monitoring in the rst period and mon-
itoring in the second.
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Corollary 4 The objective function is strictly increasing in R2:
Proof. is straightforward.
Thus, as R2 increases, total monitoring costs fall and this implies that the
borrowers total expected prots are maximized. However, since zd falls as well,
either the optimal value of R2 is 1 + Ec(L) or it is less but zd is zero. That
is, either there is no monitoring in the rst period or the bank collects the
maximum amount possible given the outside option, in the second period.
The following result has been proved in general, assuming that expected
monitoring costs are an increasing and convex function of the amount collected.
It can be shown that this assumption is satised here. However, we can also
prove it directly in a straightforward way.
Corollary 5 zd < z^:
Proof. There are two possibilities for the optimal value of R2: R

2 = 1+Ec(L)
or R2 is such that zd = 0: Since z^ > 0; we only need to show that zd  z^
if R2 = 1 + Ec(L): Now, using the results from the main part of the paper,
namely that the net total repayment is constant in solvent states at R2+zd L;
and substituting for R2; the break-even constraint simplies to zd + Ec(L) =
L+Ec1+EEc2: Or zd Ec1 = L+EEc2 Ec(L): If zd = z^; we have z^ Ec(L) =
L+EEc2 Ec(L); or z^ = L+EEc2  L+Ec(L): Since z^ >
R z^
0
(z)dF+z^
RH
z^
dF;
and RHS is smaller than in the static model, the break-even constraint is slack
and thus, zd must be strictly less than z^:Hence the result.
In the example considered above, the optimal value of R2 is 2:048 4 because
zd < 0 for all R2 > 2:048 4; and 1 + Ec(L) = 2: 441 4: Also, bz = 2:5739: This
means that the second loan becomes zero only at 3.5739 in the GH case whereas
in the dynamic model, the second loan is zero starting at 2.0484. Thus, at the
optimum, we have zd = 0; so that there is no monitoring at date 1. The
dynamic contract achieves reduces total monitoring costs to almost zero while
the sequence of two GH contracts entails a much higher monitoring cost. This is
an extreme but interesting scenario. All monitoring occurs in the second period
to minimize the overall expected repayment by the borrower. This need not
always be the case. For example, if H = 6; k = 0:3; L = 1; R2 = 1 + Ec(L) =
1:058 and zd = 1: 121 8 < z^ = 1:1734: Here, the second loan becomes zero
approximately at the same z in both cases: 2.1738.
Thus, we have shown that in the example of uniform distribution and xed
monitoring costs, the optimal contract entails less monitoring in the rst period
than in the static Gale-Hellwig contract. The result is lower total monitoring
costs in the dynamic case than in the static case. In the simulations, we see that
the second period monitoring threshold is also lower, for all date 1 realizations,
in the dynamic case and thus, the lender is able to be lenient in both periods
when a long term contract is allowed.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Let
E [R2(z)jz > zd] = R^
Then, the contract is minimizing the following expected cost
E [c(z)jz > zd]
given the following two constraints
E [R2(z)jz > zd]  R^
and
E[R2jz0]  E[R2jz] + z   z0 8z0 > z  zd
Since
Cz2(z^2) =
Z z^2
0
c(u)dF (u);
@Cz2(z^2)
@z^2
= c(z^2)f(z^2)
and
E[R2(z^2)] =
Z z^2
0
udF (u) + z^2 [1  F (z^2)] ; @E[R2(z^2)]
@z^2
= 1  F (z^2)
@CR2 (ER2)
@ER2
=
c(z^2(ER2))f(z^2(ER2))
1  F (z^2(ER2))
and since by assumption this is increasing in ER2, CR2 (ER2) is a convex func-
tion of R2.
Now, notice that once the rst period z is realized, then if z > zd, the bank
sets the next period threshold z^2(z) and the next period expected revenue as
follows:
E[R2jz] =
Z z^2(z)
0
c(u)dF (u) + z^2(z) [1  F (z^2(z))]
The set of E[R2jz] satisfying the two constraints
E [R2jz > zd]  R^
E[R2jz0]  E[R2jz] + z   z0 8z0 > z  zd;E[R2jz0] > 0; E[R2jz] > 0
is a convex set. Therefore, a solution exists.
Now, assume that the incentive constraint IC1 does not bind, i.e. there exist
z1 and z2 such that z1 < z2 and
E (R2jz2) < E (R2jz1) + z1   z2
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First, suppose that ER2 is continuous in [z1; z2]. Then, from the intermediate
value theorem, there exists a point ~z 2 (z1; z2) such thatZ ~z
z1
[(u  ~z)  (ER2j~z   ER2ju)] f(u)du =
Z z2
~z
[(~z   u)  (ER2ju  ER2j~z)] f(u)du:
(10)
To see why, let ~z = z1. Because IC1 is satised, for any u 2 (z1; z2),
E (R2ju)  E (R2jz1)  z1   u
and from the continuity of E (R2jz), there exists z < z2 close enough to z2 such
that for any u 2 [z; z2]
ER2ju  ER2jz1 < z1   u
Therefore,
RHS =
Z z2
z1
[(z1   u)  (ER2ju  ER2jz1)] f(u)du

Z z2
z
[(z1   u)  (ER2ju  ER2jz1)] f(u)du > 0 = LHS
Similarly, from the continuity of E (R2jz), there exists z > z1 close enough to
z1 such that for any u 2 [z1; z]
E (R2jz2)  E (R2ju) < u  z2
Hence, for ~z = z2
LHS =
Z z2
z1
[(u  z2)  (E (R2jz2)  E (R2ju))] f(u)du

Z z
z1
[(u  z2)  (E (R2jz2)  E (R2ju))] f(u)du > 0 = RHS:
Therefore, the claim holds. LetdER2ju = ER2ju
for u =2 [z1; z2] and dER2ju = E (R2j~z) + ~z   u:
for u 2 [z1; z2]. Then, from equation (9), we can see thatZ z2
z1
hdER2ju  E (R2ju)i f(u)du
=
Z z2
z1
[E (R2j~z)  E (R2ju) + ~z   u] f(u)du
=
Z ~z
z1
[ER2j~z   ER2ju+ ~z   u] f(u)du+
Z z2
~z
[ER2j~z   ER2ju+ ~z   u] f(u)du = 0
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Therefore, one can show that dER2ju satises the incentive constraints and
E
hdER2jz > zdi = R^:
Now, consider the expected monitoring cost. There exists ER 2 (ERjz1; ERj~z) >
ER 2 (ERj~z;ERjz2) and thus, once again, using the intermediate value the-
orem, we obtain,Z z2
z1
CR2(ERju)f(u)du
=
Z ~z
z1

CR2(dERju) + c(z(ER))f(z(ER))
1  F (z(ER))

ERju dERju f(u)du
+
Z z2
~z

CR2(dERju) + c(z(ER))f(z(ER))
1  F (z(ER))

ERju dERju f(u)du
>
Z z2
~z
CR2(dERju)f(u)du:
The last inequality is from the assumption that
c(z^(ER))f(z^(ER))
1  F (z^(ER)) >
c(z^(ER))f(z^(ER))
1  F (z^(ER)) ;z^(ER
) > z^(ER)
Next, assume that ERju is not continuous in [z1; z2]. Then, for some ~z, there
exists  > 0 such that
infz<~zE[R2jz]  supz0>~zE[R2jz0] > 
Then, dene ~ER such that
~ER2ju = (ER2j~z) + ~z   u:
where
~ER2j~z = supz0>~zE[R2jz0] + 
2
Then, choose 1, 2 such that 1 < ~z < 2, 1; 2 2 [z1; z2] andZ ~z

1
h
ER2ju  ~ER2ju
i
f(u)du =
Z 
2
~z
h
~ER2ju  ER2ju
i
f(u)du
Because of the continuity of the integral, and the monotonicity of the LHS and
RHS functions with respect to 1 and 2, such 1, 2 can be found. Then, denedER2 such that dER2ju = ~ER2ju
for u 2 [1; 2] and dER2ju = ER2ju
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otherwise. Then, again, one can show that
E
hdER2jz > zdi = E [ER2jz > zd] + Z 2

1
hdER2ju  ER2jui f(u)du
=
Z ~z

1
hdER2ju  ER2jui f(u)du+ Z 2
~z
hdER2ju  ER2jui f(u)du = bR:
Z 
2

1
CR2(ER2ju)f(u)du
=
Z ~z

1

CR2(dER2ju)f(u)du+ c(z(ER2))f(z(ER2))
1  F (z(ER2))

ER2ju dER2 f(u)du
+
Z 
2
~z

CR2(dER2ju)f(u)du+ c(z(ER2 ))f(z(ER2 ))
1  F (z(ER))

ER2ju dER2ju f(u)du
>
Z 
2

1
CR2(dERju)f(u)du:
The last inequality is due to the convexity of c() resulting in
c(z(ER))f(z(ER))
1  F (z(ER)) >
c(z(ER))f(z(ER))
1  F (z(ER)) ;z(ER
) > z(ER)
Now, let
 =
Z z2
z1
CR2(ERju)f(u)du 
Z z2
z1
CR2(dERju)f(u)du
Now, dene for some small positive ,
ER2jz =Max
ndER2jz   ; 0o
for z 2 [z1; z2]. Then, by construction
E

ER2jz > zd

< R^
and because of continuity,Z z2
z1
CR2
 
ER2ju

f(u)du 
Z z2
z1
CR2
dER2ju f(u)du D
for some constant D > 0. Thus once can choose  small enough such that
(1 D) < 
Therefore, one can slightly decrease expected revenue such that
E R2jz > zd
  E CR2   ER2jz jz > zd
= [ER2jz > zd]  E [CR2 (ER2jz) jz > zd] +    [1 D]
> [ER2jz > zd]  E [CR2 (ER2jz) jz > zd] ;
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i.e. higher than the original expected net revenue, which contradicts the as-
sumption that the original revenue function minimized equation 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. From previous results, we can simplify the break-
even constraint as follows:Z H
z
RdF + EER2  
Z z
0
(L  z)dF   L  Ec1   EEc2
= R2   F (zd)CR2(R2) 
Z R2+zd
zd
CR2(R2 + zd   z)dF   L
+
Z H
0
Min fzd; zg dF   L 
Z zd
0
c(z)dF = 0
Now, denote
R1(z) =
Z H
0
Min fz; ug dF (u)
Then, total revenue minus total cost for dynamic model can be expressed as
follows
R2+R1(zd) F (zd)CR2(R2) 
Z R2+zd
zd
CR2(R2+zd z)dF  2L CR1(R1(zd))
Notice that the Gale Hellwig one period threshold zGH and its corresponding
R1GH = R1(zGH) satisesZ H
0
Min fzGH ; zg dF   L 
Z zGH
0
c(z)dF = 0
or
R1GH   L  CR1(R1GH) = 0
Then, the corresponding R2 = R2GH would be such that
R2GH   F (zGH)CR2(R2GH) 
Z R2GH+zGH
zGH
CR2(R2GH + zGH   z)dF   L = 0
and
R2GH < L+ CL(L)
because if we let
R2 = L+ CL(L)
R2 F (zd)CR2( R2) 
Z R2+zd
zd
CR2( R2+ zd  z)dF  L > R2 CR2( R2) L = 0
Now, consider two values, RL and RH such that RL < RH  L+CL(L). First,
let
R1 = RH ;R2 = RL:
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Then, the rst period threshold corresponding to R1 = RH is z1H , such that
RH =
Z H
0
Min fz1H ; zg dF
Then, total revenue minus total cost is
RH +RL CR1(RH) F (z1H)CR2(RL) 
Z RL+z1H
z1H
CR2(RL+ z1H   z)dF   2L
On the other hand, if we let R1 = RL and R2 = RH , Then, the total revenue
minus total cost is
RL+RH  CR1(RL) F (z1L)CR2(RH) 
Z RH+z1L
z1L
CR2(RH + z1L  z)dF   2L
Furthermore, because RL < RH , the rst period threshold is z1L < z1H . then
the total monitoring cost is
CR1(RL) + F (z1L)CR2(RH) +
Z RH+z1L
z1L
CR2(RH + z1L   z)dF (11)
 CR1(RH) + F (z1L)CR2(RL) +
Z RH+z1L
z1L
CR2(RL + z1L   z)dF (12)
< CR1(RH) + F (z1H)CR2(RL) +
Z RL+z1H
z1H
CR2(RL + z1H   z)dF (13)
Below, we show the inequality. First, wlog, dene
CR2(R) = 0 ifR < 0
Then, because of convexity, for z1L  z
EC(RH)  EC(RL) =
Z RH
RL
@CR2(R)
@R
dR

Z RH+z1L z
RL+z1L z
@CR2(R)
@R
dR
= CR2(RH + z1L   z)  CR2(RL + z1L   z)
Then,
(2)  (1) = (1  F (z1L)) [CR2(RH)  CR2(RL)]
 
Z RH+z1L
z1L
[CR2(RH + z1L   z)  CR2(RL + z1L   z)] dF
= (1  F (RH + z1L)) [CR2(RH)  CR2(RL)]
+
Z RH+z1L
z1L
[(CR2(RH)  CR2(RL))  (CR2(RH + z1L   z)  CR2(RL + z1L   z))] dF
 0
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Next, we show (3) > (2).
(3)  (2) =
Z z1H
z1L
[CR2(RL)  CR2(RL + z1L   z)] dF
+
Z RL+z1L
z1H
[CR2(RL + z1H   z)  CR2(RL + z1L   z)] dF
+
Z RL+z1H
RL+z1L
CR2(RL + z1H   z)dF
 
Z RH+z1H
RL+z1H
CR2(RL + z1L   z)dF
 0
The rst and second terms are positive because of CR2(R) being an increasing
function, and the fourth term is zero because for z  RL+z1H , CR2(RL+z1L 
z) = 0. So far, we have shown that for the same total R2 +R1(zd); it is better
to set R2 higher than R1 rather than the other way around.The same argument
holds if we substitute RH = L + CL(L) and RL = R2GH . Thus, it is better to
set R2 = L+CL(L) and R1 = R2GH < L+CL(L): This implies that zd < zGH
since R1 = L+ CL(L) under static GH and it gives lower monitoring cost with
the same revenue. This implies that the GH sequence of contracts cannot be
optimal and further that, zd < zGH ; since if not, then R2 < R1 and that cannot
be optimal.
Next, consider the case where z1H > zGH , i.e. R1 = RH > L+ CL(L), and
RL < RH . Then, we cannot use the ipping argument because if we ip RL
and RH , then R2 = RH > L + EC(L), violating the IC4. I this case, consider
the alternative where ~R1 = RH   > ~R2 = RL +, thus
~R1 + ~R2 = RH +RL
where  = RH  L Ec(L). Then, again, we can focus on the total sum of the
expected monitoring cost. We rst show that
CR2(RH) + F (z1H)CR2(RL) +
Z RL+z1H
z1H
CR2(RL + z1H   z)dF
 CR2( ~R1) + F (z1H)CR2( ~R2) +
Z RL+z1H
z1H
CR2( ~R2 + z1H   z)dF
This is because
CR2(RH)  CR2( ~R1) = @CR2(R^)
@R^
jR^ ~R1 (14)
F (z1H)
h
CR2( ~R2)  CR2(RL)
i
+
Z RL+z1H
z1H
h
CR2( ~R2 + z1H   z)  CR2(RL + z1H   z)
i
dF
= F (z1H)
@CR2(R^)
@R^
jR^ ~R1 +
Z R2+z1H
z1H
"
@CR2(R^)
@R^
jR^ ~R1
#
dF (15)
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Because of convexity,
@CR2(R^)
@R^
jR^ ~R1 
@CR2(R^)
@R^
jR^ ~R1
therefore,
(4)  (5)
and we have shown the inequality. Furthermore, because CR2() is increasing,
and z1H > ~z1
CR2( ~R1) + F (z1H)CR2( ~R2) +
Z R2+z1H
z1H
CR2( ~R2 + z1H   z)dF
> CR2( ~R1) + F (~z1)CR2( ~R2) +
Z ~R2+~z1
~z1
CR2( ~R2 + ~z1   z)dF
Therefore, z1 > zGH does not result in lower expected 2 period monitoring cost.
Proof of Proposition 7. To make the borrower stay at date 1, the bank
must ensure that
Ez2   ER2jz  Ez2   E(Rjz; z0);8z; z0  zd; (1)
where
E(Rjz; z0) = L+R(z0)  z + Ec(L+R(z0)  z); z  L+R(z0):
Simplifying, and letting R = minz0(R(z
0));
ER2jz  L+R  z + Ec(L+R  z)8L+R  z  zd (1)
ER2jz   Ec(L+R(z)  z)  L+R  z + Ec(L+R  z)  Ec(L+R(z)  z)
 L+R  z  L+ zd   z
Therefore, for z  zd;
ER2jz   EC(ER2jz)  (L  z)  zd
Similarly, for z < zd,
ER2jz   EC(ER2jz) = ER2jz   Ec(L)  L = L  z + z
ER2jz   EC(ER2jz)  (L  z)  z:
Integrating over z 2 [0; z], we obtain
EER2   EEC2  
Z z
0
(L  z)dF 
Z zd
0
zdF + zd (F (z)  F (zd))
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Now, the break-even constraint requiresZ H
z
RdF + E(E(R2))  L 
Z z
0
(L  z)dF   Ec1   E(Ec2) = 0:
Note that R  ER2jz+ z L  R+Ec(L+R  z) for all z 2 [zd; L+R]: Thus,
R R  zd: Thus, Z H
z
RdF + EER2   EEC2  
Z z
0
(L  z)dF

Z zd
0
zdF + zd (F (z)  F (zd)) + zd (1  F (z))
=
Z zd
0
zdF + zd (1  F (zd))
Therefore, for zd < zGHZ H
z
RdF + EER2   EEC2  
Z z
0
(L  z)dF   Ec1   L

Z zd
0
zdF + zd (1  F (zd))  Ec1   L
<
Z zGH
0
zdF + zGH (1  F (zGH))  Ec1;GH   L = 0
resulting in negative prot. Therefore, zd  zGH holds, and thus, the dynamic
bank has to be tougher in the 1st period and more lenient in the 2nd.
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